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For the future generation of energy systems, secure communication is a key component in ensuring a reliable
and stable operation. The actual respective standard to define the communication network architectures
for substation automation is the IEC 61850. In order to address the shortcomings of IEC 61850 w.r.t.
communication security, IEC 62351-6 introduces respective recommendations. However, a thorough analysis
of these recommendations shows that the authenticity and integrity of time-critical protocols such as Generic
Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) messages are not entirely covered by the proposed security
measures. Therefore, in the present contribution, implementation of the RSASSA-PSS and HMAC-SHA256
authentication are investigated for the given context. Comparison with previous works is provided and
obtained results show that the HMAC scheme has a better computational time than the recommended
RSASSA-PSS. Thus, adjustment of the IEC 62351-6 considering the authentication of GOOSE messages
shall be considered in the next edition of the standard.
Cyber-physical security; authentication; RSA; HMAC; electrical substations; IEC 61850; IEC 62351; GOOSE.
1. INTRODUCTION
The use of Information and Communication
Technologies (ICT) is becoming more spread in
energy systems as it offers real-time control,
monitoring and maintenance features. The integration
of the respective IEC 61850 standard International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) (2007) in the
development of the future energy systems provides
several advantages – among interoperability and
faster communication over Ethernet.
Despite all the advantages offered by IEC 61850, the
standard was created without security being a primary
goal. Unfortunately, there has been little focus on the
threats that might affect the network communication
security of electrical substations. Part 6 of IEC 62351
in International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)
(2010) was thereafter introduced in order to extend
IEC 61850 with security measures. [More details
about these security recommendations can be found
in Section 2.2].
An accurate analysis of the proposed IEC 62351
security measures for the GOOSE protocol in IEC
61850 (which is used to broadcast event data over
the electrical substation network) shows that the latter
remains largely untouched by security premises in
IEC 62351 (see Section 2).
In particular, authenticating the GOOSE messages
to prevent replay and tampering attacks, was only
partially addressed in IEC 62351-6. Ensuring the
integrity and authenticity of GOOSE messages is
critical for the optimal operation of the electrical
substation. Thus, it is a relevant topic that has
been considered within the research community in
the last few years. Hohlbaum et al. (2010) analyze
practical considerations of security recommendations
in IEC 62351 by checking implementation of digital
signatures on different platforms. The performance
assessment of the authentication schemes was
studied considering limitations of Intelligent Electronic
Devices (IEDs) and real-time requirements of the
GOOSE protocol. It is worth noting that the
computational time of Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)
signature as presented in Hohlbaum et al. (2010),
includes only the signing of the hash value omitting
the verification of the digital signature. In Ishchenko
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and Nuqui (2018), implementation of RSA and Hash-
Based Message Authentication (HMAC) for GOOSE
authentication as bump-in-the-wire was presented.
Computational time of RSA 1024-bit, HMAC and
Galoi Message Authentication Code (GMAC) was
compared with the previously mentioned work. A
delay simulation of the network implementation
of GOOSE authentication based on HMAC was
presented in Fang et al. (2018). A software simulation
based on OPNET was considered, but no details
about the GOOSE authentication scheme were
provided.
In the previously mentioned works, the exact
authentication scheme recommended in IEC 62351-
6, namely RSA Probabilistic Signature Scheme with
Appendix (RSASSA-PSS), was not evaluated. Works
considering the implementation of the exact signature
scheme proposed in IEC 62351-6 are scarce.
Farooq et al. (2019) analyzed the implementation
of probabilistic signature schemes as RSASSA-
PSS signature with 1024 and 2048-bit keys for the
authentication of GOOSE messages and compared
obtained results with previous works. Achieved
results show that probabilistic signature schemes
cannot meet the hard real-time requirements of
GOOSE messages. However, no comparison with
symmetric cryptographic authentication methods was
undertaken.
Therefore, in the present paper, shortcomings of the
authentication scheme proposed in the IEC 62351-6
standard are first presented and analyzed. In this light,
the recommended signature-based RSASSA-PSS
authentication is thus implemented in order to secure
GOOSE messages and results show incompatibilities
with real-time requirements of GOOSE protocol. An
alternative authentication method based on HMAC
is thus, proposed to satisfy the real-time constraints.
Both authentication schemes are compared to assess
their performance in order to propose necessary
adjustments of the IEC 62351-6 in the next edition of
the standard.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In
Section 2, the basics of the GOOSE protocol are
first introduced. Then, a summary of the security
recommendations in IEC 62351-6 followed by an
analysis of the different shortcomings of the security
measures of the GOOSE protocol is given. To
address the unveiled security flaws, authentication
schemes for GOOSE messages are explained in
Section 3.1 and further tested and implemented in
Section 4. Finally, in Section 5 conclusions and future
work are presented.
2. SHORTCOMINGS OF SECURITY
RECOMMENDATIONS IN IEC 62351 FOR GOOSE
PROTOCOL
When first proposed, the IEC 61850 International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) (2007) was not
particularly focused on the security aspects of energy
systems. However, different attack scenarios against
IEC 61850 electrical substations were presented in
existing works such as in Kush et al. (2014) and
Hoyos et al. (2012). Consequently, the IEC 62351
standard introduced recommendations to guarantee
the information security of power systems using,
for instance, authentication mechanisms. The IEC
62351 standard was developed by the Technical
Committee 57 within the Working Group 15 (TC57
WG15) and the 1st edition was published back
in 2007. The standard is split into eleven parts
concerned with the end-to-end security of the
communication in power systems. Part 6 of the
IEC 62351 standard, in particular, proposes security
measures for the electrical substations based on
IEC 61850. Necessary knowledge about the GOOSE
protocol will be introduced in the following. For ease
of use, the IEC 61850 and IEC 62351 will be referred
to as 61850 and 62351, respectively.
2.1. GOOSE protocol
The data object model defined in the 61850 stan-
dard is mapped to different protocols. The GOOSE
protocol in the International Electrotechnical Commis-
sion (IEC) (2011) is a multicast publisher/subscriber
data transfer method mapped directly over Ethernet.
GOOSE messages are exchanged between process
and bay levels as well as between IEDs in the bay
level.
A specific transfer mechanism is used to ensure
the reliability of GOOSE messages without the
conventional acknowledgment procedure. When an
event occurs, a GOOSE message is generated and
repeated first at high frequency, then at a slower
one until reaching a predefined frequency in stable
conditions.
Even though security is not the core of the 61850
standard, there are some mechanisms to comply with
the strict real-time requirements. A first approach
consists in mapping GOOSE messages directly to
the link-layer to reduce processing time. Another
mechanism to ensure efficient processing and
transmission is to select a high priority tag to avoid
slowing down the transmission of GOOSE packets.
The GOOSE message frame has a datagram
complying with ISO/IEC 8802.3. More details can
be found in 61850-8.1 International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) (2011). Within the frame structure,
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there is a field called "Security" that is reserved for
digital signature according to the recommendations in
62351 in International Electrotechnical Commission
(IEC) (2010). However, no further details are provided
in 61850-8.1. In the following, some of the main
suggestions, presented in IEC 62351-6, for the
security of the GOOSE protocol are reported.
2.2. Main security recommendations in IEC
62351
Different security measures for GOOSE messages
were described in 62351-6 International Electrotech-
nical Commission (IEC) (2010). Firstly, use of the
fields Reserved 1 for the number of the extension
octets and Reserved 2 for a 16-bit cyclic redundancy
check (CRC) is recommended. Secondly, the 62351-
6 standard International Electrotechnical Commission
(IEC) (2010) recommends the authentication of the
GOOSE messages with a digital signature. Indeed,
a security extension of the Application Protocol Data
Unit (APDU) with an RSA-based signature with
Appendix-Probabilistic Signature Scheme (RSASSA-
PSS) is proposed (see Bellare and Rogaway (1996)).
It is however, worth noticing that the RSA signature
explicitly excludes the Ethernet header. Authentica-
tion and integrity of GOOSE messages supporting
the digital signature is thus guaranteed.
Another security recommendation in 62351-6 intro-
duces an extension in the Substation Configuration
Language (SCL) files to allow the use of different
certificates for GOOSE messages. An additional
security algorithm against replay attacks was set in
62351-6. It is based on a check of the freshness of the
messages with skew filtering and messages times-
tamps. However, for hard real-time applications such
as for GOOSE messages with 3ms response time, no
encryption scheme is suggested. It is indeed, clearly
stated in International Electrotechnical Commission
(IEC) (2010) that "for applications [...] requiring 3ms
response times, multicast configurations and low CPU
overhead, encryption is not recommended."
2.3. Security flaws in IEC 62351
Whereas the 62351-6 standard enhances the security
of GOOSE messages considerably, it needs further
improvements as there are still some security flaws.
Implementation of security solutions for peer-to-peer
communications might lead to an undesirable latency
as concluded by Hoyos et al. (2012). Firstly, in
62351-6, it is clearly stated that encryption is not
recommended for GOOSE messages in International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) (2010). Thus, the
risk of Denial Of Service (DoS) attacks is still present.
The security of GOOSE messages is limited to
adding a digital signature to their APDU. However, the
performance of the authentication mechanisms based
on digital signatures recommended for Sampled
Values (SV) and GOOSE communications is still an
open question. In fact, strict real-time requirements
for certain messages cannot be respected yet as it
was shown by Hohlbaum et al. (2010). This might
be a shortcoming when considering specific type
of messages such as 1A GOOSE messages that
should have a maximum of 3ms response time
as specified in 61850 International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) (2007). Therefore, one of the
current challenges is to reconcile the needs for
security and low latency as suggested by Hoyos et al.
(2012) in electrical substations. Most manufacturers
do not yet consider practical implementation of the
encryption and authentication due to the remaining
ambiguity. Thus, the acceptance of 62351 will largely
depend on its impact on interoperability, performance,
and manageability as presented by Hohlbaum et al.
(2010). Works such as Hohlbaum et al. (2010) and
Farooq et al. (2019) have been carried out w.r.t.
testing the authenticity and integrity of GOOSE
messages according to 62351-6. However, only
one of them i.e. Farooq et al. (2019) implemented
the exact RSAASS-PSS authentication scheme as
reported in Section 1. As there is still little clarity
on how to implement security for fast GOOSE
messages without degrading the actual performance
of Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) Hoyos et al.
(2012), the present paper will shed a light on possible
authentication schemes that shall be considered
for the security of GOOSE messages. Different
authentication schemes that might be used to ensure
the integrity and authenticity of GOOSE messages
are presented in the next section.
3. AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES TO SECURE
GOOSE MESSAGES
Authentication of the communication within modern
electrical substations covers two main security goals
which are integrity and authenticity, respectively.
The integrity of a message is ensured provided
that the data is accurate and consistent without
any unauthorized tampering. Digital signatures or
Message Authentication Codes (MAC) combined with
cryptographic hashing techniques such as HMAC are
commonly used to ensure integrity and authenticity.
3.1. Digital Signature Authentication
Digital signatures are mathematical algorithms used
to ensure the authenticity and integrity of GOOSE
messages. A hash value of the message is first
calculated using a private key and attached to
the original message by the publisher. The signed
message is then sent to the subscriber. Using a
public key, the signature of the received GOOSE
message is decrypted. Next, the hash of the original
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GooseAPDU
SHA
256
8 0x00 bytes GooseAPDU
Hash SaltM
′=
SHA
256
PS 0x01 SaltDB=
MGF
maskedDB maskedSeed 0xbcEM=
Figure 1: Signing step of RSASSA_PSS
message is computed. To check the authenticity
of the GOOSE message, the hash computed from
the received message and the one decrypted, are
compared. Usage of digital signatures ensures that
the message is truly sent from an authorized source.
Integrity is also provided, since modifying a message
after being signed would invalidate the signature.
RSA signatures are one of the most common digital
signatures schemes that were first published in Rivest
et al. (1978). Using probabilistic digital signatures
is recommended in IEC 62351-6 as it offers better
security International Electrotechnical Commission
(IEC) (2010). Thereby the so-called Probabilistic
Signature Scheme (PSS) takes the message as well
as a random value as the inputs to the hash function.
The RSA-Probabilistic Signature Scheme with
Appendix (RSASSA-PSS) algorithm was chosen
in 62351-6 to authenticate GOOSE messages
in electrical substations. A newer version of the
signature scheme that uses the PKCS-v1_5 encoding
operation was proposed in the PKCS standard Böck
(2011). There are two main steps in the signing
of a GOOSE message according to RSASSA-PSS
procedure which are applying the signature and the
validation steps.
Figure 1 describes the different operations of the
probabilistic signature RSASSA-PSS signing stage.
The first step when encoding a GOOSE message
is to hash with Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) 256
algorithm the GOOSE APDU. A masked hash (M’)
is obtained from the encoded message to which a
salt and padded eight zeros are added. This value
is further hashed using a SHA256 algorithm which
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Figure 2: Verification step of RSASSA_PSS
results in a maskedSeed. Then, a Mask Generation
Function (MGF) is applied to the result of the previous
step. An XOR operation between the DB – that is a
concatenation of zero padding PS, 0x01 value as
well as a salt – and the MGF allows obtaining a
maskedDB. The encoded message (EM) is a result of
the concatenation of the maskedDB, the maskedSeed
and a compatibility value (0xbc).
The second step of the process namely the RSASSA-
PSS verification is presented in Figure 2. The reverse
steps are performed: From the received encoded
message, the DB is obtained from an XOR operation
between the MGF of the maskedSeed and the
maskedDB. Then, the hash value maskedSeed’ is
computed from the recovered salt. This value is finally
compared with the one received in the message to
check the authenticity of the GOOSE packet.
3.2. Message Authentication Code based on
keyed hash (HMAC)
Instead of the asymmetric RSA algorithm suggested
in 62351-6, the HMAC algorithm with the SHA256
hash calculation can be used ( see Krawczyk et al.
(1997) ). Choosing a symmetric cryptography method
such as HMAC for the integrity and authenticity of
the GOOSE protocol offers different advantages. For
instance, a reduced computational time is expected
with the use of private keys. As the calculation of the
digest with HMAC is based on a combination of the
message content and the key at the same time, a
faster computation is expected. The HMAC algorithm
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is mainly based on calculating a code derived from
the GOOSE message and a private key value. The
HMAC algorithm has as inputs a key extracted from
a corresponding certificate as well as the GOOSE
APDU. The output of the algorithm, namely digest,
is appended to the original message and sent by
the publisher. The subscriber performs the same
algorithm with the received message and compares
both, the received and calculated HMAC values to
check the authenticity and integrity of the message (
see Krawczyk et al. (1997) ).
Usage of the Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI)
scheme is recommended in 61850-90-5 for the
key management, but no further specification are
provided in the first edition of 62351 ( International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) (2010) ). For
comparison reasons with a 1024-bit RSA digital
signature authentication scheme, a key length of 128-
bit is used for the HMAC algorithm. The algorithm 3.1
describes the different steps to obtain a HMAC code.
The GOOSE publisher calculates the HMAC value
and appends it to the message that is then sent to
the subscriber. The subscriber recalculates a new
value of the HMAC code based on the received
message and the secret key. This second value is
compared with the one appended to the received
GOOSE message to verify the authenticity and the
identity of the sending entity.
Algorithm 3.1: HMAC_SHA256 (GooseAPDU, key)
Vars:
{
blockSize :integer//512 bits
outputSize :integer//256 bits
SHA256 :hash function
if length(key) > blockSize
then key ← SHA256(key)
if length(key) < blockSize
then key ← pad(key, blockSize)
o_key_pad = keyxOR[0x5c ∗ blockSize]
i_key_pad = keyxOR[0x36 ∗ blockSize]
return
{
SHA256(o_key_pad ‖ SHA256
(i_key_pad ‖ GooseAPDU))
4. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS OF
AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES OF GOOSE
MESSAGES
The previously presented authentication mecha-
nisms are implemented using the OpenSSL by
Andrew Young and Hudson (1998) library version
1.0.2 on an Intel i7-8550U CPU @ 1.80 GHz with
16 GB RAM system. The simulation of the GOOSE
messages is carried out as suggested in Elbez et al.
(2018). Considerations of key management should
take into account the large networks structure of
electrical substations and the strict time requirements
which is out of the scope of the present paper. Thus,
private key management is not considered in the
remainder, but it will be dealt with in future work.
To compare our results with the ones reported in the
literature, table 1 is established in order to summarize
the different characteristics of the used platforms to
simulate GOOSE authentication methods.
As shown in table 2, most of the asymmetric
cryptographic solutions based on RSA are unable
to meet the real-time requirements for GOOSE
messages, except when using a Xeon Server CPU
(3,1) where the computation of an RSA 1024-
bit requires 0.3 ms Ishchenko and Nuqui (2018).
However, hardaware used in (3,1) does not reflect
the one used in electrical substations ( Ishchenko
and Nuqui (2018) ): When using the whole signature
scheme RSASSA-PSS as specified in 62351-6,
improved results are obtained, however, still without
complying with the 3ms requirement.
Choosing the most suitable key could be also
challenging, since, according to a report of NIST
back in 2011, RSA 1024-bit keys might be used.
However, in a 2013 NIST report, the use of a 2048-
bit key was recommended instead, cf. Barker and
Dang (2015). In the present paper, RSA-1024 bit are
implemented as use of 2048-bit would imply an even
larger computational time.
As expected, when considering HMAC, the total
authentication time is of the order of micro-seconds
independently from the used platform as shown in
table 3. In fact, HMAC algorithms have a better
computational time as the digest calculation is
directly computed from the message and the key
together. The recommendations suggested in 62351-
6 regarding the authentication and the integrity
of GOOSE messages using RSASSA-PSS digital
signature should be reconsidered and probably
replaced by a symmetric cryptographic scheme such
as HMAC-SHA256.
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, a review of the the different secu-
rity recommendations suggested in IEC 62351-6
is presented. The different vulnerabilities of those
recommendations concerning GOOSE security are
analyzed. Based on those shortcomings, authenti-
cation schemes to secure GOOSE messages are
introduced and performance results concluded. Au-
thentication using digital signatures with probabilistic
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Ref. Index Technical details
The present work (1,1) Intel i7-8550U CPU @ 1.80 GHz
Hohlbaum et al. (2010)
(2,1) Pentium M 1.7 GHz / 1GB RAM
(2,2) Intel Core 2 Duo @ 2.2 GHz / 2GB RAM
(2,3) FPGA (100 MHz)
(2,4) FPGA (200 MHz)
Ishchenko and Nuqui (2018)
(3,1) Xeon X3440 server 2.53 GHz quad-core
(3,2) BeagleBone Black (TIAM3359 ARM Cortex A8CPU @ 1 GHz)
(3,3) RPi2 Raspberry Pi 2 (Broadcom BCM2836quad-core ARM Cortex A7 overclocked at 1 GHz
Farooq et al. (2019) (4,1) Intel i5-3210M CPU @ 2.50 GHz
Table 1: Technical details in implementation of authentication of GOOSE messages
Digital Signature
Index
RSA with
1024-bit key
in ms
RSASSA-PSS
with 1024-bit key
in ms
(1,1) 9.2 4.3
(2,1) 6.8 -
(2,2) 4 -
(2,3) 3.748 -
(2,4) 1.917 -
(3,1) 0.3 -
(3,2) 5 < t < 7 -
(3,3) 10 < t < 12 -
(4,1) 10 5.45
Table 2: Digital signature computational time in ms
Message Authentication Code
Index
HMAC-SHA256
(32 Bytes key)
in μs
HMAC
(16 Bytes key)
in μs
(1,1) 16 -
(3,1) - 4
(3,2) - 23
(3,3) - 53
Table 3: HMAC calculation computational time in μs
signature scheme (RSASSA-PSS), as suggested in
62351-6, shows unsatisfactory results for hard real-
time GOOSE messages that require 3ms response
time. When compared with digital signatures, au-
thentication methods based on symmetric authen-
tication mechanisms offers better computational time.
Implementation of HMAC-SHA256 on a platform
comparable to a modern Intelligent Electronic Device
(IED) largely satisfies the GOOSE messages’ strict
time requirements. A respective adjustment of the IEC
62351-6 considering the authentication of GOOSE
messages shall be considered in the next edition of
the standard.
As future work, this authentication scheme will be
further tested as a security filter or bump-in-the-wire
implementation on a different hardware platforms
in order to analyze its operation with legacy IEDs
and thus its backward compatibility. As presented
in Section 2, one of remaining challenges when
addressing GOOSE security, is to defend against DoS
attacks. Future work will include a better analysis
of this shortcoming as well as possible solutions
such as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) to ensure
availability within the electrical substation networks.
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